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WHEN CLAIMS ABOUT LOLLIPOPS ARE BEST 
KEPT UNDER WRAPS: CAN THE FDA 
REGULATE OFF-LABEL SPEECH? 
Emily Moss* 
 
While the COVID-19 pandemic continues, it can be easy to 
forget other health crises which our country faces. One such cri-
sis is the opioid epidemic. Perhaps unlike the COVID-19 pan-
demic, “[i]t is accurate to describe the opioid epidemic as a man-
made plague, twenty years in the making.”1 One of its causes 
was drug manufacturers encouraging doctors to prescribe strong 
opioids for uses not approved by the FDA.2 Such uses are re-
ferred to as “off-label” uses.3 For example, one drug manufac-
turer, Cephalon, promoted an extremely strong opioid, Actiq.4 
The FDA approved Actiq, a fentanyl product which is consumed 
in lollipop form for rapid absorption, only for opioid-tolerant can-
cer patients: “[Actiq] is an opioid analgesic indicated only for 
management of breakthrough cancer pain in patients 16 and 
older with malignancies who are already receiving and who are 
tolerant to opioid therapy for their underlying persistent cancer 
pain.”5 Yet Cephalon and its sales force promoted Actiq to pre-
scribers for unapproved situations, such as migraines,6 despite 
knowledge that the drug could cause “addiction, hypoventilation, 
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 1. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2018 WL 
6628898, at *21 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2018). 
 2. See 60 Minutes, Pharma Execs Used Strip Clubs, Broke FDA Law to 
Boost Opioid Sales, YOUTUBE (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1jLVP156_E. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Highlights of Prescribing Information 1 
(2007) [hereinafter FDA’s Actiq Label] (emphasis in original). 
 6. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to Pay 
$425 Million & Enter Plea to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Marketing, JUS-
TICE.GOV (Sept. 29, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/Septem-
ber/08-civ-860.html. 
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or death, particularly in patients who were not already opioid-
tolerant.”7 
The FDA has long maintained that such off-label promotion 
is illegal—indeed criminal—regardless of its truth.8 Thus, when 
it discovered Cephalon’s conduct, the government charged Ceph-
alon with off-label promotion. In 2008, Cephalon entered a plea 
agreement, agreeing to a fine of $50 million for the off-label pro-
motion of Actiq and two other drugs.9 
The FDA’s mission is to “protect[] the public health by en-
suring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary 
drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by ensuring 
the safety of our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products 
that emit radiation.”10 Due to the increasingly complicated na-
ture of pharmaceuticals,11 the public relies on the FDA to regu-
late manufacturers’ claims. But current law is expanding First 
Amendment protection over commercial speech, frustrating the 
FDA’s important goals.12 Off-label promotion bans regulate what 
drug manufacturers can say, and so have met a number of First 
Amendment challenges.13 The FDA off-label promotion ban reg-
ulates commercial speech, which must only meet intermediate 
scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.14 Yet, First Amendment 
protection of commercial speech has continually expanded.15 
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit held that any content-based re-
strictions must meet strict scrutiny, even when restricting com-
mercial speech.16 
 
 7. Complaint with Jury Demand at ¶ 15, Friel v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:10-
CV-00180, (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2010), ECF No. 1, 2010 WL 1608294 (quoting an 
indictment charging Cephalon with unlawfully promoting Actiq for non-cancer 
pain uses not approved by the FDA in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)). 
 8. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); 21 U.S.C. § 352(f); 21 CF.R. § 201.5. 
 9. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company Cephalon to Pay $425 
Million For Off-Label Drug Marketing, JUSTICE.GOV (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2014/01/09/Cepha-
lon%20Press%20Release.pdf. 
 10. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What We Do, FDA.GOV (March 28, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do. 
 11. See Philip E. Alford, Rethinking FDA Regulation of Complex Products, 
21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 477, 477–78 (2020). 
 12. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13. See, e.g., id. 
 14. See id. at 164–66. 
 15. See, e.g., Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 16. Id. at 703. 
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This Note examines the continually expanding First 
Amendment protection of commercial speech and its implica-
tions on the FDA’s off-label promotion ban. Part I provides back-
ground on the First Amendment, commercial speech, and how 
these laws have affected the FDA’s off-label promotion ban. Part 
II explains that the off-label promotion ban is essential to the 
FDA’s important role in protecting the public’s health and safety 
in light of the opioid epidemic—among other concerns. This Note 
concludes by analyzing possible solutions to First Amendment 
challenges to the ban. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. FDA REGULATION AND OFF-LABEL USE 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate phar-
maceutical drugs and medical devices.17 Through its “notori-
ously expensive” premarket approval process, the FDA deter-
mines if a drug or device is safe and effective for its intended 
use.18 A key part of the FDA’s approval process is creating a drug 
label, which outlines the drug’s specific approved doses, its tar-
geted diseases, and its intended patients.19 
Once the FDA approves a drug or device for a particular use, 
physicians may prescribe it for other, off-label uses.20 Off-label 
prescribing is very common,21 accounting for approximately 21% 
 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. §301 et seq. 
 18. Carl Wiersum, No Longer Business as Usual: FDA Exceptionalism, 
Commercial Speech, and the First Amendment, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 486, 540 
(2018). 
 19. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Mar-
keting of Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Com-
plaints, 8 PLOS MED. 1, 9 (2011). 
 20. Wiersum, supra note 18, at 541; United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 
153 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 21. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-
Label Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 648 (2014) (“[O]ff-label marketing 
has been described as so common among drug and device makers that it’s often 
dismissed as the equivalent of driving slightly over the speed limit.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Kevin Costello & Eric Johnston, Manufac-
turer Liability for Off-Label Uses of Medical Devices, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 
18 (“[I]t is relatively common for doctors to prescribe drugs or medical devices 
for off-label uses.”). 
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of prescriptions in the United States.22 Such off-label prescribing 
often offers a potential remedy for novel conditions, diseases for 
which there is no current FDA-approved treatment, medical sit-
uations closely related to the drug’s approved use, and for pa-
tients for whom FDA-approved treatments have failed.23 The 
FDA recognizes that off-label “uses may be appropriate and ra-
tional in certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect ap-
proaches to drug therapy that have been extensively reported in 
medical literature.”24 
Despite the prevalence and overall acceptance of off-label 
prescribing, the FDA prohibits manufacturers from promoting 
off-label uses.25 Manufacturers often market their drugs’ on-la-
bel uses through a process called “detailing,” a common practice 
where marketers visit doctors in their offices to provide infor-
mation about the manufacturer’s drugs.26 These “detailers” at-
tempt to persuade doctors to prescribe their drugs by providing 
samples, giving pamphlets, and describing medical studies.27 
However, the detailer cannot mention or describe off-label 
uses. Although the FDCA does not expressly prohibit manufac-
turer promotion of off-label uses,28 the FDA has stated that “[a]n 
approved drug that is marketed for an unapproved use (whether 
in labeling or not) is misbranded because the labeling of such 
drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.’”29 Misbrand-
ing is prohibited under the FDCA.30 
 
 22. Shariful A. Syed et al., The Law and Practice of Off-Label Prescribing 
and Physician Promotion, 49 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 53, 53–54 (2020). 
 23. Chelsea Weidman Burke, The Common, Yet Unspoken, Practice of Off-
Label Drug Prescribing, BIOSPACE (July 1, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/
article/the-common-yet-unspoken-practice-of-off-label-drug-prescribing/. 
 24. 12 FDA Drug Bull. 1, 5 (1982). 
 25. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); 21 U.S.C. § 352(f); 21 CF.R. § 201.5. 
 26. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557–58 (2011). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 29. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution 
of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on 
Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical 
Devices, FDA.GOV (Jan. 2009), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/
search-fda-guidance-documents/good-reprint-practices-distribution-medical-
journal-articles-and-medical-or-scientific-reference; see also Caronia, 703 F.3d 
at 155. 
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (prohibiting “[t]he introduction or delivery for intro-
duction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or 
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded”). 
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 Under FDA regulations, manufacturers can communicate 
about their drugs’ off-label uses in at least two ways.31 First, they 
can “respond to unsolicited questions from healthcare profes-
sionals about off-label uses.”32 “Second, they can disseminate re-
prints of scientific or medical journal articles or reference books 
discussing off-label uses of drugs and devices under certain cir-
cumstances.”33 
Off-label promotion is common, despite the FDA’s ban.34 
Manufacturers seek to expand use of their drugs to unapproved 
diseases (the most common goal according to one study), to un-
approved subtypes (for example, recommending a drug approved 
for adults for use in children), and to approved uses at higher 
than approved doses.35 According to one survey of unsealed whis-
tleblower reports, off-label promotion most often occurs when 
manufacturers present data of off-label uses to prescribers: “off-
label use was frequently encouraged through self-serving 
presentations of the scientific literature through which physi-
cians were given false or unbalanced study data supporting the 
unapproved use.”36 The FDA can, through a federal prosecutor, 
criminally charge defendants with misbranding under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 333(a).37 For example, William Facteau, former CEO of medi-
cal device manufacturer Acclarent, was convicted of a federal 
 
 31. Recent Case, First Amendment—Commercial Speech—Second Circuit 
Holds That Prohibiting Truthful Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved Drugs 
by Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates First Amendment—United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795, 801 n.63 (2013) 
[hereinafter Recent Case, HARV. L. REV.]. 
 32. Id.; 21 CF.R. § 99.1 (2013). 
 33. Recent Case, HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 801 n. 63. 
 34. Kesselheim, supra note 19, at 9. 
 35. Id. at 5. 
 36. Id. (“A common example was selective presentation of favorable stud-
ies, where dangers from the off-label uses allegedly being promoted were not 
mentioned. Other examples included presenting one drug as being superior to 
another when no head-to-head studies had been conducted and characterizing 
reports of individual cases or poorly designed studies as definitive evidence sup-
porting an off-label use.”). 
 37. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2012) (outlin-
ing two charges brought against the defendant: “[c]ount [o]ne: [c]onspiracy to 
introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2); and [c]ount [t]wo: [i]ntroducing a misbranded drug, 
Xyrem, into interstate commerce, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) 
and 333(a)(2)”). 
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misdemeanor for off-label promotion of a sinus balloon cathe-
ter.38 Although the prosecutor urged the judge to impose a six-
month prison sentence, the judge instead fined Facteau $1 mil-
lion.39 
Those who support banning manufacturer off-label promo-
tion cite public safety concerns. They argue that physicians 
should make medical decisions unclouded “by misinformation 
from a company trying to build its bottom line.”40 Further, they 
contend that this approach prevents unreasonable risk, and pre-
serves the current regulatory scheme by providing manufactur-
ers with an incentive to seek FDA approval for any additional 
uses of an approved drug.41 Opponents argue that banning off-
label promotion increases the cost of drug and device production 
and prohibits manufacturers from sharing—and doctors from re-
ceiving—important true information.42 As for public safety con-
cerns, they maintain that tort liability provides a sufficient de-
terrent to any misinformation a manufacturer might convey.43 
 
 38. United States v. Facteau, No. 15-CR-10076-ADB, 2020 WL 5517573, at 
*1–2 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2020). 
 39. Nate Raymond, Judge Apologizes for Four-Year Delay in Sentencing 




e=true..; see also 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2019) (“[I]f any person commits such a 
violation after a conviction of him under this section has become final, or 
commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person 
shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than 
$10,000, or both.”). 
 40. Greene, supra note 21, at 648 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion To Resolve Allegations 
of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html). 
 41. Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the 
First Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 243 (2014). 
 42. John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective 
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299, 305–06 (2010). 
 43. Id. at 305. 
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B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Although most defendants charged with off-label promotion 
choose to settle, a few have challenged the FDA’s off-label pro-
motion ban, claiming that it violates the First Amendment.44 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
against state actions that “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”45 
The First Amendment is an essential, yet sometimes necessarily 
limited, guarantee.46 Commercial speech is one situation in 
which First Amendment guarantees are limited.47 Initially, the 
Supreme Court construed the First Amendment to lend no pro-
tections to commercial speech.48 However, the Court eventually 
extended some First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech.49 Early on, such protection was fairly limited. Through a 
number of more recent decisions, the Court has afforded addi-
tional First Amendment protection, leading some to conclude 
that there is now little if any distinction between commercial 
and non-commercial speech. 
i. The Birth of the Central Hudson Test 
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment pro-
tection of commercial speech in the 1942 case, Valentine v. 
Chrestensen.50 In that case, the Court upheld a New York City 
Sanitary Code that prohibited street distribution of commercial 
advertising, holding that the First Amendment does not protect 
 
 44. E.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012); see also 
Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 241 (“Increasingly, however, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have raised the First Amendment as a defense to (or even in 
anticipation of ) such charges.”). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. E.g., Bradford W. Scharlott, The First Amendment Protection of Adver-
tising in the Mass Media, in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 1, 2 (The-
odore R. Kupferman, ed. 1990) (explaining that the government has an interest 
in regulating commercial speech to ensure the public is not subject to false or 
misleading advertisements). 
 47. E.g., id. 
 48. See infra Section I.B.i. 
 49. See infra Section I.B.ii. 
 50. 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also Wiersum, supra note 18, at 492. 
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such speech.51 More than three decades later, however, in Bige-
low v. Virginia, the Supreme Court retreated from Valentine.52 
The Court held that a Virginia statute banning advertisements 
for abortion—an attempt to get around the recent decision in Roe 
v. Wade53—violated the First Amendment.54 In its decision, the 
Court described Valentine as “distinctly a limited” holding that 
“obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that ad-
vertising is unprotected per se.”55 
One year later, the Court expanded the First Amendment 
protection of commercial speech.56 In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court 
held that, because the speaker has an interest in freedom of com-
mercial speech, and because consumers should be informed, the 
First Amendment protects commercial speech.57 In evaluating 
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising prices, the Court recognized that “[i]t 
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppress-
ing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely avail-
able, that the First Amendment makes for us.”58 Virginia could 
not impose professional standards on pharmacists “by keeping 
 
 51. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942) (“Whether, and to 
what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to 
what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of 
user, are matters for legislative judgment. The question is not whether the leg-
islative body may interfere with the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but 
whether it must permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion 
of, or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the people in 
fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated. If the respondent 
was attempting to use the streets of New York by distributing commercial ad-
vertising, the prohibition of the code provision was lawfully invoked against his 
conduct.”); see also Wiersum, supra note 18, at 492. 
 52. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975) (“[Valentine] obviously 
does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per 
se.”) 
 53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 54. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818 (“The fact that the particular advertisement 
in appellant’s newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s 
commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees.”). 
 55. Id. at 819–20. 
 56. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
 57. Id. at 760–71. 
 58. Id. at 770. 
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the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that compet-
ing pharmacists are offering.”59 The Court emphasized that its 
holding did not suggest that commercial speech could not be reg-
ulated.60 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist correctly predicted61 that 
the majority’s holding would lead pharmacists to “energetically 
promote their [drug] sale.”62 
The Court adopted intermediate scrutiny for First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas &. 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York when it 
struck down a New York state restriction on electric company 
promotional advertisements.63 Under Central Hudson, the Court 
must first determine whether the First Amendment protects the 
speech.64 For commercial speech to be protected by the First 
Amendment, “it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.”65 Next, the Court evaluates whether the “asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.”66 Then, the Court deter-
mines if the regulation directly advances that governmental in-
terest.67 Finally, the Court asks whether the regulation is “no 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”68 Thus, 
under Central Hudson, a regulation of commercial speech sur-
vives First Amendment review if it directly advances a substan-
tial governmental interest through means no more extensive 
than is necessary.69 And significantly, under Central Hudson, 
the First Amendment does not protect false or misleading com-
mercial speech.70 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 770–71 (“In concluding that commercial speech, like other varie-
ties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any 
way. Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible. We 
mention a few only to make clear that they are not before us and therefore are 
not foreclosed by this case.”). 
 61. Wiersum, supra note 18, at 495. 
 62. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 63. Cent. Hudson Gas &. Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 557 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 566. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; see also Wiersum, supra note 18, at 496. 
 70. Cent. Hudson Gas &. Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
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ii. The Evolution of the Central Hudson Test 
Although Central Hudson has not been overturned, recent 
cases have broadened First Amendment protection over com-
mercial speech.71 For example, in Rubin v. Coors, the Court 
claimed to apply Central Hudson, yet it imposed new require-
ments—that the rule advance the government’s interest in a “di-
rect and material way” and that a regulation could not have any 
less restrictive alternatives.72 
In 2020, in International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, the 
Sixth Circuit created a circuit split by announcing that a con-
tent-based speech restriction receives strict scrutiny, even where 
the restriction concerns commercial speech.73 The court empha-
sized language from the Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert explaining that laws that are content-based, either on their 
face or in their justification, are subject to strict scrutiny, thus 
“a court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the 
law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scru-
tiny.”74 According to the Sixth Circuit, Reed requires that Cen-
tral Hudson and intermediate scrutiny only apply to content-
neutral commercial speech restrictions.75 The court criticized a 
number of post-Reed circuit court decisions that applied Central 
Hudson to content-based speech restrictions.76 
Under International Outdoor, a court must first determine 
if a speech restriction is content-based.77 “Regulation of speech 
is content-based . . . if a law applies to particular speech because 
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed; some 
obvious facial distinctions based on a message include defining 
regulated speech by particular subject matter or by its function 
or purpose.”78 If the court determines that the speech restriction 
 
 71. Wiersum, supra note 18, at 500–11. 
 72. Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995). 
 73. Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 703 (6th Cir. 2020) (“It 
follows that the intermediate-scrutiny standard applicable to commercial 
speech under Central Hudson, . . . applies only to a speech regulation that is 
content-neutral on its face. That is, a regulation of commercial speech that is 
not content-neutral is still subject to strict scrutiny under Reed.”). 
 74. Id. at 703 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 166 (2015)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 703–06 (noting, in one example, that “instead of applying 
the Reed standard, the court proceeded without much explanation to apply 
the Central Hudson standard”). 
 77. Id. at 703. 
 78. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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is content-based, then under strict scrutiny, the restriction is 
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compel-
ling state interests[.]”79 
If reasoning similar to International Outdoor is accepted by 
the Supreme Court, it will constitute a significant expansion of 
commercial speech protection. Under the early application of 
Central Hudson, in order to survive a First Amendment chal-
lenge, a commercial speech restriction was required to directly 
advance a substantial governmental interest through means no 
more extensive than is necessary.80 In contrast, under the mod-
ern application of Central Hudson, a speech restriction must also 
advance the government’s interest in a “direct and material way” 
and may not have a less restrictive alternative.81 And under In-
ternational Outdoor, in the Sixth Circuit, content-based com-
mercial speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored and serve 
a compelling state interest.82 
C. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
Cases applying the First Amendment to commercial speech 
regarding pharmaceuticals have similarly moved closer to a 
strict scrutiny approach. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Su-
preme Court invalidated a Vermont law that prohibited phar-
macies from selling “records that reveal the prescribing practices 
of individual doctors” to pharmaceutical companies.83 While per-
mitting others to acquire this data, the Vermont law sought to 
prevent pharmaceutical manufacturers from obtaining or using 
it to market brand-name drugs directly to individual doctors.84 
Sorrell concluded that the law “enacts content- and speaker-
based restrictions” on protected speech and thus required 
“heightened scrutiny” under the First Amendment.85 Rejecting 
the claim that “heightened judicial scrutiny” did not apply to 
“mere commercial regulation,” the Court nonetheless declined to 
 
 79. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 80. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 81. Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995). 
 82. Int’l Outdoor, Inc., 974 F.3d at 703. 
 83. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 566–67. 
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decide whether to apply “a special commercial speech inquiry” 
(i.e., Central Hudson) or “a stricter form of judicial scrutiny.”86 
Instead, it held that the Vermont law failed under either analy-
sis because it was not sufficiently narrowly drawn to advance 
the State’s asserted interests in, inter alia, protecting medical 
privacy, avoiding harassment of physicians, improving public 
health, and reducing healthcare costs.87 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Ka-
gan, dissented. The dissent found that Vermont’s “effort to reg-
ulate a commercial enterprise” did not require any “special 
‘heightened’ standard of review” beyond the Central Hudson 
test.88 Indeed, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court had 
never applied content-based and speaker-based categorizations 
to commercial speech.89 Further, it warned that whatever First 
Amendment standard applied to Vermont’s law would likewise 
apply to “similar regulatory actions,” including those taken by 
the FDA.90 The dissent closed with a significant warning: “[a]t 
best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment chal-
lenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only in-
cidentally affect a commercial message. At worst, it reawakens 
Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for demo-
cratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at 
issue.”91 
True to Justice Breyer’s prediction, in Caronia, the Second 
Circuit applied Sorrell to FDA regulations.92 Caronia is, to date, 
the most directly on point case involving a First Amendment 
challenge to a prosecution for off-label promotion. The defend-
ant, Caronia, appealed his conviction for misdemeanor conspir-
acy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce un-
der 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 331(a)(1), arguing that he was 
convicted for his protected speech.93 The appellate court agreed, 
holding that “the government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for 
 
 86. Id. at 566–71. 
 87. Id. at 568. 
 88. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 586 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to Supreme Court case 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 92. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 93. Id. at 152. 
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speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved 
drug” that is not false or misleading.94 
The court first determined that the government prosecuted 
Caronia for his speech, and did not merely use his speech as ev-
idence of intent to misbrand.95 Next, the court applied Sorrell 
and held that the FDA ban was subject to heighted scrutiny be-
cause it is both content-based and speaker-based.96 Yet, after de-
termining that it would apply heightened scrutiny, the court 
then applied Central Hudson.97 The court first found that the 
speech concerned a lawful activity, off-label uses, and the speech 
was not false or misleading.98 Although it found the govern-
ment’s interest “in drug safety and public health” substantial, 
the court held that the off-label promotion ban does not directly 
advance that interest.99 The ban’s paternalism, the fact that off-
label use is legal, and the claim that the speech at issue was not 
misleading supported the determination that the ban does not 
directly advance the government’s interest.100 Similarly, the 
court found that the “complete and criminal ban on off-label pro-
motion by pharmaceutical manufacturers” is not narrowly 
drawn.101 The ban, the court concluded, “is more extensive than 
necessary to achieve the government’s substantial interests.”102 
The court therefore held that the off-label promotion ban failed 
under heightened Central Hudson scrutiny.103 Yet, citing the 
canon of constitutional avoidance, the court did not strike down 
 
 94. Id. at 164–69. 
 95. Id. at 161. 
 96. Id. at 164. 
 97. Id. at 165–69. 
 98. Id. at 165. Although it likely could have, the FDA did not claim that 
Caronia’s speech was false or misleading. Id. at 165 n.10 (“The government did 
not argue at trial, nor does it argue on appeal, that the promotion in question 
was false or misleading.”). 
 99. Id. at 167. 
 100. Id. at 166–67. 
 101. Id. at 167. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 168. 
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the ban.104 Rather it concluded that “the truthful off-label pro-
motion of FDA-approved prescription drugs” is outside the scope 
of the FDA’s off-label promotion ban.105 
Judge Livingston dissented. She argued that the govern-
ment did not violate the First Amendment because it only used 
Caronia’s speech as evidence of his motive or intent to commit a 
misbranding offense.106 She cautioned that “the majority calls 
into question the very foundations of our century-old system of 
drug regulation.”107 The FDA chose not to seek certiorari or en 
banc review of the decision in Caronia.108 
The Southern District of New York subsequently applied 
Caronia in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug 
Administration, where, in a turn of events, the drug manufac-
turer sued the FDA.109 Amarin sought a declaratory judgment 
permitting it to promote an off-label use of its drug Vascepa 
through truthful and non-misleading speech.110 Amarin claimed 
that “the FDA’s threat of a misbranding action [wa]s chilling it 
from engaging in constitutionally protected truthful speech.”111 
Responding to Amarin’s request for preliminary relief, the court 
addressed two important FDA arguments, ruling against the 
FDA in each.112 First, the court rejected the FDA’s claim that it 
 
 104. Id. at 160 (“Thus, under the principle of constitutional avoidance, ex-
plained infra, we construe the FDCA as not criminalizing the simple promotion 
of a drug’s off-label use because such a construction would raise First Amend-
ment concerns. Because we conclude from the record in this case that the gov-
ernment prosecuted Caronia for mere off-label promotion and the district court 
instructed the jury that it could convict on that theory, we vacate the judgment 
of conviction.”). 
 105. Id. at 168–69 (“Our conclusion is limited to FDA-approved drugs for 
which off-label use is not prohibited, and we do not hold, of course, that the FDA 
cannot regulate the marketing of prescription drugs. We conclude simply that 
the government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their rep-
resentatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of 
an FDA-approved drug.”). 
 106. See id. at 172 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 169 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 108. See Recent Case, HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 798 n.41 (2013) (citing 
Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won’t Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324539304578260323575925). 
 109. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 223–24. 
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was using Amarin’s speech merely as evidence of its intent to 
sell Vascepa for an unapproved use, rather than regulating the 
speech itself.113 
Second, the court rejected the FDA’s argument that Caronia 
was a limited holding that applies only to the facts of that par-
ticular case.114 The court was entirely unimpressed with this ar-
gument, and even stated at a hearing that the court and the FDA 
“clearly have a very substantial difference of opinion how to 
read Caronia.”115 Instead, the court quoted Caronia’s explicit 
holding where the Second Circuit “conclude[d] simply that the 
government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting 
the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”116 
For the above reasons, and because it found the speech at 
issue was not false or misleading, the Amarin court granted pre-
liminary relief.117 Amarin illustrates two key points. First, at 
least in the Second Circuit, the First Amendment does indeed 
preclude the FDA from prohibiting truthful and non-misleading 
off-label promotion. Second, the FDA has been highly reluctant 
to adjust its off-label promotion strategy, even though it consist-
ently results in losses. 
Finally, in 2020, in United States v. Facteau, a court denied 
the defendants’ motion for acquittal or a new trial based on their 
convictions for misdemeanor adulteration and misbranding of a 
medical device.118 The defendants argued, inter alia, that the 
government violated the First Amendment by relying on “truth-
ful, non-misleading speech” to convict them.119 Although the 
court declined to overturn the conviction, it did acknowledge that 
there are valid First Amendment and policy concerns about the 
current regulatory scheme.120 
 
 113. See id. at 223–25. 
 114. See id. at 225. 
 115. Id. at 224. 
 116. Id. at 226 (quoting United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
 117. Id at 237. 
 118. United States v. Facteau, No. 15-CR-10076-ADB, 2020 WL 5517573, at 
*1 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2020). 
 119. Id. at *12. 
 120. Id. at *1 (“There is also a First Amendment overlay that further com-
plicates the analysis. It seems clear that the statutory and regulatory scheme 
needs to be rethought. Currently there is no statute that specifically prohibits 
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D. THE FDA’S SPEECH AS INTENT APPROACH 
One approach to avoid First Amendment scrutiny that the 
FDA has taken, and which the courts in Caronia and Amarin 
rejected, is to argue the FDA off-label promotion ban does not 
prohibit speech.121 Rather, the FDA only uses speech as evidence 
of intent to introduce misbranded drugs into the market.122 Be-
cause, under this theory, the FDA does not ban speech, the mis-
branding statutes and regulations do not restrict protected ex-
pression under the First Amendment. This argument finds 
support in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, where the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the evidentiary use 
of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive 
or intent.”123 Advancing this argument in her Caronia dissent, 
Judge Livingston offered the following illustration: 
There might be no law forbidding the consumption of arsenic. But this 
would not endow Abby and Martha with a First Amendment right to 
offer arsenic laced wine to lonely old bachelors with the intent that they 
drink it. And any statements Abby or Martha made suggesting their 
intent—even if all of the statements were truthful and not mislead-
ing—would not be barred from evidence by the First Amendment 
simply because arsenic might legally be consumed.124 
In sum, the First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech is expanding. While the FDA maintains that it’s off-label 
promotion ban does not violate the First Amendment, many 
courts that have heard the issue have not agreed. 
 
off-label marketing and yet the Government continues to prosecute the conduct 
by patching together the misbranding and adulteration regulations, thereby 
criminalizing conduct that it is not entirely clear Congress intended to crimi-
nalize.”). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 172 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 161 (“Even assuming the government can offer evidence of a de-
fendant’s off-label promotion to prove a drug’s intended use and, thus, mislabel-
ing for that intended use, that is not what happened in this case.”). 
 123. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993); see also Greene, supra 
note 21, at 679. 
 124. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 175 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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II. STRIKING THE FDA OFF-LABEL PROMOTION BAN IS 
UNDESIRABLE 
As some commentators have noted,125 it seems very likely 
that the Supreme Court will eventually consider the FDA’s 
power to regulate off-label promotion. Moreover, narrowing or 
striking down the FDA’s off-label promotion ban is entirely in 
line with recent First Amendment precedent.126 However, strik-
ing the off-label promotion ban will impede the FDA’s ability to 
effect its important goals of “protecting the public health by en-
suring the safety, efficacy, and security of . . . drugs.”127 
Recall that FDA approval means that the benefits of a drug 
outweigh the harms for a certain use. Because approval consid-
ers only factors for that particular use, it may be significantly 
easier for a drug to gain FDA approval where the need is 
great.128 Take Actiq, the drug discussed above that has contrib-
uted to the opioid crisis. When the FDA approved Actiq for opioid 
tolerant cancer patients, it weighed the benefits of providing re-
lief to extreme pain where other milder pain relief was ineffec-
tive, against any and all dangers associated with Actiq.129 In that 
narrow situation, the FDA determined that the drug warranted 
approval.130 But had Cephalon submitted Actiq to the FDA for 
migraines, approval might well have been denied. Thus—absent 
 
 125. Wiersum, supra note 18, at 288 (“Sooner or later, FDA will have to con-
tend with the protections that commercial speech has gained over the past four 
decades.”). 
 126. See Recent Case, HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 800 (“Although Caro-
nia is defensible as a matter of constitutional doctrine, it is undesirable as a 
matter of policy.”). 
 127. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 10. 
 128. Katherine A. Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physi-
cian’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-
Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 164 
(2007) (“From a pharmaceutical industry perspective, however, once a drug is 
approved for a first use, off-label sales expand, sometimes by many multiples. 
This market fact encourages manufacturers to seek FDA approval only for the 
narrowest, most easy to support indications and then reap the benefits of off-
label sales.”). 
 129. Cf. FDA’s Actiq Label, supra note 5 (“[Actiq] is an opioid analgesic in-
dicated only for management of breakthrough cancer pain in patients 16 and 
older with malignancies who are already receiving and who are tolerant to opi-
oid therapy for their underlying persistent cancer pain” (emphasis in original)). 
 130. Cf. id. 
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an off-label promotion ban—a manufacturer has a strong incen-
tive to seek approval only for a narrow use, especially where the 
need is grave.131 Then, once the drug is approved for that use, 
the manufacturer could simply promote the drug for other uses. 
That promotion would likely even be truthful in a sense. Actiq, 
for example, does mitigate migraine pain.132 However, the off-
label use would lack examination and approval by an unbiased 
third party to determine that the particular use is both safe and 
effective. 
The opioid epidemic demonstrates that there must be some 
government regulation to determine which uses that might be 
marketed are safe. And it stands as a strong reminder that per-
mitting off-label promotion tends to delay, or perhaps prevent 
altogether, FDA review of new uses for already approved drugs. 
When a company stands to make a significant amount of money 
by promoting a drug—perhaps even an addictive drug—in inap-
propriate circumstances, some companies will exploit that op-
portunity. And some will do so despite the potential for signifi-
cant harm to the public. 
In extreme cases, to argue that such examination and ap-
proval is unnecessary calls into question the entire FDA pre-
market approval process.133 If manufacturers are permitted to 
present any studies or promotion materials to doctors under the 
assumption that doctors are educated and can determine on 
their own if the evidence is sufficient to determine that a drug is 
reasonably safe,134 then what purpose does the FDA premarket 
approval process serve?135 
 
 131. See, e.g., Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 243. 
 132. See Stephen H. Landy, Oral Transmucosal Fentanyl Citrate for the 
Treatment of Migraine Headache Pain in Outpatients: A Case Series, 44 HEAD-
ACHE 762, 764 (2004). 
 133. Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 245. 
 134. See Greene, supra note 21, at 692 (explaining that “courts have viewed 
doctors, the targets of detailing, as sophisticated customers” in the context of 
off-label promotion). 
 135. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2012) (Liv-
ingston, J., dissenting) (“The FDCA’s prohibition on off-label marketing directly 
advances this interest. If drug manufacturers were allowed to promote FDA-
approved drugs for non-approved uses, they would have little incentive to seek 
FDA approval for those uses. Prohibiting such promotion is thus ‘one of the few 
mechanisms available’ to encourage participation in the approval process. And 
premarket approval improves drug safety and effectiveness only to the extent 
that drugs are not sold without such approval . . . Furthermore, allowing drug 
manufacturers to promote off-label uses would undermine the FDA’s approval 
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As the discussion above illustrates, the off-label promotion 
ban is essential to allow the FDA to protect the public. In the 
case of off-label promotion of opioids, where prescription opioids 
were involved in 32% of 47,000 opioid overdose related deaths in 
2018,136 it is key to the FDA’s mission. The opioid epidemic is not 
a unique event, instead, it is merely illustrative of the need for 
an off-label promotion ban. For example, manufacturers have 
noticed the COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity to market off-
label. The FDA has sent a number of warning letters to manu-
facturers who claim their drugs can treat COVID-19.137 Off-label 
prescribing may be desirable where, as is currently the case with 
COVID-19, on-label treatments are lacking. However, the FDA 
must be able to regulate off-label promotion. Otherwise, some 
profit-seeking manufacturers may take advantage of the public 
desperation for new treatments by promoting drugs for unap-
proved uses, claiming that they provide treatment that is in fact 
not effective, or ignoring dangerous side effects. If the FDA is to 
carry out its mission of protecting public health, it must be able 
to regulate such conduct. 
III. A REGULATORY AND LITIGATION STRATEGY 
As the discussion above demonstrates, First Amendment re-
view of commercial speech restrictions is getting more demand-
ing, regardless of whether it is called “intermediate,” “height-
ened,” or “strict” scrutiny. Unfortunately, the FDA has so far 
failed to adapt. As one commentator noted, the FDA’s “response 
 
process for not only new uses of pre-approved drugs, but also for entirely new 
drugs. As explained above, when determining whether a drug should be ap-
proved, the FDCA requires consideration not only of the drug’s safety, but also 
its effectiveness . . . If a drug manufacturer must be allowed to distribute a drug 
for any use so long as it is approved for one use, the government’s balancing of 
a drug’s benefits against its risks becomes very difficult or even impossible. 
Drugs viewed as safe for certain uses might be considered unsafe overall if the 
benefits and risks being weighed are not for a specific intended use but rather 
for any use at all, whether supported by evidence or not.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 136. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, The Drug Overdose Epidemic: 
Behind the Numbers, CDC.GOV (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/drugover-
dose/data/index.html. 
 137. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Fraudulent Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19) Products, FDA.GOV (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/consum-
ers/health-fraud-scams/fraudulent-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-prod-
ucts. 
288 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:2 
 
to these series of losses was not to reevaluate its ap-
proach . . . strategically choos[e] not to appeal losses, and gener-
ally attempt[] to carry on business as usual.”138 The FDA’s drug 
approval framework does not contemplate the current First 
Amendment problems, because it pre-dates any First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech.139 To protect its regula-
tion of off-label promotion, the FDA should pass regulations that 
only prohibit false and misleading off-label promotion. The FDA 
can also preserve regulation of off-label promotion through a 
new litigation strategy, where it emphasizes evidence showing 
that the off-label promotion was false or misleading. 
A. REGULATIONS THAT SURVIVE FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES 
The FDA should pass regulations that explicitly prohibit 
false and misleading off-label promotion, while acknowledging 
that some forms of true speech are constitutionally protected. 
Explicitly in those regulations, the FDA should continue to crim-
inalize false off-label promotion. However, it should switch its 
approach to misleading speech, instead pursuing only civil rem-
edies. In its new regulations, the FDA should clearly define 
“false and misleading.” 
i. Criminal False Speech and Civil Misleading Speech 
Regardless of whether the FDA alleges it, most FDA off-la-
bel promotion prosecution involves false or misleading speech.140 
By explicitly prohibiting only false and misleading speech, the 
FDA will put itself in a strong position to survive First Amend-
ment scrutiny without sacrificing its power to pursue most of the 
cases that it would under its current structure. Because criminal 
prosecution is a strong deterrent, and because false speech is 
easier to identify, the FDA should continue to criminally prose-
cute false off-label promotion. False promotion has the greatest 
potential for harm and should thus have the most severe conse-
quences. 
 
 138. Wiersum, supra note 18, at 488. 
 139. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 
226–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 140. Recent Case, HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 802 n.41 (2013) (citing 
Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won’t Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision, Wall 
St. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424127887324539304578260323575925). 
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However, the FDA should adjust its approach to misleading 
speech by pursuing only civil remedies. Prohibiting misleading 
off-label promotion under a civil scheme would have a number of 
benefits. First, under a civil approach the FDA would not have 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the information was 
misleading. This would allow the FDA to pursue cases where the 
off-label promotion was misleading as long as a preponderance 
of the evidence shows that it was misleading. Moreover, chang-
ing off-label promotion sanctions from criminal to civil would al-
leviate some concerns regarding notice.141 Whether information 
is misleading is likely a fact intensive question. Criminalizing 
the spread of misleading information thus does not necessarily 
put the public on notice of what is considered criminal conduct. 
However, a more fact-based subjective approach is more appro-
priate in a civil action. A civil statute or regulation prohibiting 
misleading off-label promotion could thus allow the FDA to pur-
sue its goals without encountering challenges that a similar 
criminal statute would face. These benefits, in turn, would sup-
port the FDA’s claim, under a possible First Amendment chal-
lenge, that its approach advances its interest in a “direct and 
material way” that does not have any less restrictive alterna-
tives.142 Thus, even if a court is not persuaded that the FDA is 
only regulating false or misleading speech, the FDA is still likely 
to succeed. 
ii. Defining False and Misleading Speech 
To avoid First Amendment scrutiny, the FDA must define 
“false and misleading” either in line with, or narrower than First 
Amendment doctrine does. Because false is more straightfor-
ward to define, this Note focuses on how the FDA can define mis-
leading. Under the commercial speech doctrine, “when the par-
ticular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is 
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact 
 
 141. See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d at 215 (“Amarin moved 
primarily under the First Amendment, but alternatively, under the due process 
clause, on the ground that the FDA’s regulations as to misbranding were vague 
and did not ‘fairly notify Amarin of what off-label promotion is permitted and 
what is forbidden.’” (quoting Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 3588) 2015 WL 
4387279)). 
 142. Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995). 
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such advertising is subject to abuse, the [government] may im-
pose appropriate restrictions.”143 However, the government 
“may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of poten-
tially misleading information . . . if the information also may be 
presented in a way that is not deceptive.”144 The Court thus dis-
tinguishes between inherently misleading speech, which may be 
entirely banned, and potentially misleading speech, which can-
not be absolutely prohibited. Significantly, the “method of adver-
tising” can suggest that speech is inherently misleading. The 
burden of proof to show that something is misleading is on the 
government and it “cannot rely on ‘rote invocation’ of mislead-
ingness to meet that burden.”145 
When an agency determines that speech is misleading 
through “‘scientific or technical data within its area of expertise,’ 
some courts have adopted a deferential approach to ‘reasoned’ 
scientific determinations — in practice, leaning on agency as-
sessment for the misleadingness prong.”146 This deference 
makes sense in the context of off-label promotion, where the 
FDA has expertise on drug safety and efficacy. Under this ap-
proach, even with the Court’s somewhat vague definition of mis-
leading, the FDA’s definition should survive First Amendment 
scrutiny. Even without such deference, a deliberate definition 
that is not overbroad should survive. Ultimately, the FDA 
should use its expertise in drug efficacy and safety to explicitly 
define, in regulation, what constitutes misleading off-label pro-
motion. 
One approach that the FDA might try is to define “detailing” 
as being inherently misleading.147 Professor Stephanie Greene 
argues that the FDA can prohibit all off-label promotion done 
through detailing, because detailing is inherently misleading.148 
In short, her argument is that detailing is vulnerable to undue 
 
 143. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Recent Case, HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 2026 n.52 (2016) (cit-
ing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 658–59 (1985); 
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
 146. Id. at 2027 (quoting Alliance II, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 147. Greene, supra note 21, at 690 (“A common sense approach to the issue 
of off-label detailing is arguing the practice is inherently misleading.”). 
 148. Id. at 690–93. 
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influence and fraud, that doctors are often persuaded by detail-
ing in ways that the public does not expect, and that claims made 
during detailing are not verifiable.149 
 If the FDA successfully illustrates that detailing is mislead-
ing, it has met its burden. It might permissibly, under First 
Amendment doctrine, shift the burden to a defendant to prove 
that its detailing was not misleading. The primary benefit of this 
approach is that detailing happens behind closed doors. In Caro-
nia, the FDA had the benefit of an informant and a recording of 
Caronia’s detailing,150 however that is often not available. With-
out that evidence, the FDA is blind to what really occurred. It is 
therefore reasonable to shift the burden to the detailer, who will 
have unique access to evidence related to the promotion in ques-
tion. 
B. LITIGATION STRATEGIES TO SURVIVE FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES 
The FDA has tried to defeat First Amendment challenges at 
the outset by arguing that it is not limiting or restricting speech 
at all. Rather, the FDA argues it is using speech as evidence of 
intent to misbrand.151 This argument is appealing because it 
would allow the off-label promotion ban to stand as it is. How-
ever, the FDA should move on from this approach. The FDA has 
not found much success with this argument.152 Notably the ma-
jority in Caronia rejected the intent argument because, in its 
view, the theory of the government’s prosecution was in fact 
aimed at Caronia’s speech advocating off label uses and not at 
 
 149. Id. at 609–95. 
 150. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. E.g., United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., No. 5:14-CR-00926 
(W.D. TX. Feb. 26, 2016); Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (“The question is whether this use of speech to infer intent, which in turn 
renders an otherwise permissible act unlawful, is constitutionally valid. In fact, 
the First Amendment allows ‘the evidentiary use of speech to establish the ele-
ments of a crime or to prove motive or intent.’ Thus it is constitutionally per-
missible for the FDA to use speech, in the form of labeling . . . .” (internal cita-
tions omitted)); see also Wiersum, supra note 18, at 554 (“Nevertheless, FDA 
has scored several recent partial victories using its speech as intent theory. In 
February 2016, a jury acquitted the CEO of Vascular Solutions (“VSI”) in a trial 
regarding marketing of a medical device for an unapproved use—a closely re-
lated issue to marketing of a drug for an off-label use.”). 
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any intent to misbrand the drug.153 The Amarin court rejected 
the argument because the FDA’s evidence of intent argument 
failed to meet the act requirement of misbranding.154 Because 
there are strong counter arguments to this approach, and be-
cause the FDA has not had much success with it, the FDA is 
better off focusing its arguments at litigation on other strategies. 
If the FDA prohibits only false and misleading off-label pro-
motions, it should be able to avoid First Amendment scrutiny. 
Under one prong of Central Hudson that has yet to be narrowed 
or overruled, the First Amendment does not protect false or mis-
leading commercial speech.155 As a litigation strategy, the FDA 
should emphasize evidence of false or misleading statements in 
all cases, rather than asserting it can ban all speech. For exam-
ple, in Caronia, the FDA could have easily shown that Caronia’s 
speech was false or misleading.156 Caronia claimed that the drug 
he promoted off-label was “a very safe drug” despite his 
 
 153. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161–62 (“First, the government’s contention that 
it did not prosecute Caronia for promoting the off-label use of an FDA-approved 
drug is belied by its conduct and arguments at trial . . . Second, the govern-
ment’s assertion now that it used Caronia’s efforts to promote Xyrem for off-
label use only as evidence of intent is simply not true . . . Third, the govern-
ment’s summation and the district court’s instruction left the jury to under-
stand that Caronia’s speech was itself the proscribed conduct . . . Fourth, the 
government clearly prosecuted Caronia for his words—for his speech. A phar-
maceutical representative’s promotion of an FDA-approved drug’s off-label use 
is speech.”). 
 154. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 
223 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 155. Central Hudson Gas &. Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 156. Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 244 (“Had the truthfulness or mis-
leading nature of Caronia’s claims been at the heart of the case, the court’s anal-
ysis would have been quite different. The Supreme Court has held that the gov-
ernment is ‘free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, 
deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction.’” (citing Zau-
derer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985))). 
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knowledge of the drug’s dangerous side effects—including de-
pression and death.157 However, the FDA did not allege that the 
speech was false,158 a decision that likely led to the Agency’s loss. 
Another litigation strategy responds to a frequent argument 
against the FDA’s off-label promotion ban that relies on the Su-
preme Court’s recurring observations that commercial speech 
restrictions cannot be justified by paternalism.159 Justice 
Blackmun summarized this line of arguments in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy, asserting that “information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only 
they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that 
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to 
close them.”160 
In its future litigation, the FDA should emphasize two im-
portant reasons why the paternalism argument is inapplicable 
in this context: (1) research suggests that the “learned interme-
diaries” argument is false, and (2) the party harmed is not the 
party hearing the speech. First, some courts argue that doctors 
are “learned intermediaries” who “safeguard their patients from 
the aggressive marketing strategies of pharmaceutical compa-
nies.”161 However, detailing does affect doctors’ prescribing prac-
tices.162 According to one former pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentative, “it’s the doctors’ job to treat patients and not to justify 
their actions, it’s my job to constantly sway the doctors. It’s a job 
I’m paid and trained to do . . . [m]ost of the time [doctors] don’t 
 
 157. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 172 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Caronia 
later admitted that his employer required him to meet an annual sales quota of 
520 bottles of Xyrem in 2005, the year these conversations took place, and that 
he was unable to meet it. In fact, the salaries of Orphan’s sales personnel de-
pended to a significant degree on meeting sales targets, and in 2005 Caronia 
was ranked near the very bottom of Orphan’s national sales force.”). 
 158. Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 244 (“The truthfulness of [Caronia’s] 
speech, however, was never an issue at trial since the government believed it 
needed to show only that he promoted the drug for an off-label use.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Govern-
ment Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment 
Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 47 (2007). 
 160. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
 161. Greene, supra note 21, at 650–51. 
 162. Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How 
Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 623–24 
(2007). 
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even realize that’s what they’re doing.”163 Doctors therefore are 
probably not the “learned intermediaries” that some courts as-
sume they are. And when the risk for harm is so high, paternal-
ism seems appropriate.164 
Second, off-label promotion is unlike other marketing con-
sidered under the commercial speech doctrine because “unlike 
the door-to-door vendors of cosmetics and vacuum cleaners, drug 
reps do not sell their product directly to buyers. Consumers pay 
for prescription drugs, but physicians control access.”165 Most pa-
tients must trust their doctors when they prescribe a medication, 
because many patients do not have the information or expertise 
to question their doctors’ prescribing practices.166 The patients 
suffer the harm if they take unsafe or ineffective medication, yet 
it is the doctors whom the paternalism argument seeks to pro-
tect. In that sense, patients do not receive information that they 
can weigh to “perceive their own best interests,” as is the case in 
the typical commercial speech scenario. When patients are so de-
pendent on their doctors, and when doctors rather than patients 
make prescribing decisions, some paternalism is a necessary 
protection. 
The Actiq story demonstrates the importance of this argu-
ment. Patients who were in pain trusted their doctors’ prescrip-
tions. Yet, many who took Actiq for off-label uses became ad-
dicted, and many died. Should these patients have “perceived 
their own best interest” before taking the medication that their 
doctors recommended? Expecting that sort of research and ex-
pertise for each drug a patient takes is unreasonable. 
 
 163. Id. at 624; see also Hannah Fresques, Doctors Prescribe More of a Drug 
if They Receive Money from a Pharma Company Tied to It, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 
20, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-prescribe-more-
of-a-drug-if-they-receive-money-from-a-pharma-company-tied-to-it. 
 164. Cf. Greene & Noah, supra note 41, at 241 (2014) (“The practice of de-
tailing raises ethical issues as it may persuade doctors to prescribe unnecessary 
or more expensive drugs; these concerns are compounded when sales represent-
atives promote off-label uses that have not been proven safe and effective.”). But 
see Hall & Sobotka, supra note 159, at 16 (“The courts have explicitly rejected 
paternalism as a valid reason to restrict off-label speech.”). 
 165. Fugh-Berman & Ahari, supra note 162, at 621. 
 166. Tracy Weber & Charles Ornstein, Why You Should Care About the 
Drugs Your Doctors Prescribes, PROPUBLICA (July 15, 2013, 8:57 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/why-you-should-care-about-the-drugs-your-
doctor-prescribes (“For most of us, evaluating a doctor’s prescribing habits is 
just about impossible. Even doctors themselves have little way of knowing 
whether their drug choices fall in line with those of their peers.”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The FDA’s off-label promotion ban predates First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech. Yet today, the First 
Amendment extends substantial protection to commercial 
speech. Because the off-label promotion ban is essential to the 
FDA’s goal of “protecting the public health by ensuring the 
safety, efficacy, and security of . . . drugs,”167 the FDA must ad-
just its regulatory scheme and litigation strategy to be consistent 
with the First Amendment. Without the FDA as a neutral party 
weighing the costs and benefits of a drug’s use, prescribers will 
be exposed to an influx of potentially dangerous off-label promo-
tion. Some manufacturers will end-run the FDA approval pro-
cess, then promote drugs for unapproved uses. The danger of this 
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